

SYRIAN ARMY AND ITS ROLE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE SYRIA: 1954-1958

SURİYE ORDUSU VE SURİYE'NİN SİYASİ HAYATINDAKİ ROLÜ:
1954-1958

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Abstract

France in the Surian's army institutions by watching a negative and malevolent policy which is based on the tribal, contrast and ethnic. According to religious and racial minorities it created a diconcentrated syrian army and left it behind. While doing this France was knowing that national sovereignty of the people was devoid from the consciousness of independence. The main purpose was to occupy the Ethnic conscious part of society and the central authority of the military commanders area and thus acquired the wealth in their hand. France with the establishment of such an army, and the officers who were growing in thier schools continuously strengthen their national positions and taken themselves to the center of national loyalty. Therefore, from the beginning of the Syrian army in Syria have always been a vital role. In the formation of Syrians army palestians problem was one of the most influential factor. In 1948 the invasion of Arab land and defeat of Arabs against Israel the Syrians army officers blamed themselves for this defeat. This situation has caused controversy between Syrians army. It has become the cause for officers to enter in politics. In March 1949 army with military leader Husnu moved to the center of politics. Many of political affairs were given to the control of the military committee. During the Edip çiçekli reign Quartet Committee Officers was exemplified. Later, in the period of Adnan Maliki likewise a military council was formed. This council took all power of country under its control. Syrian armies play an important role while administrating their country, within its own division of powers and ethnic, because of religious and racial division it never become a homogenous, it always suffered internal struggles. In those years group like Edip çiçekli, Damascus officers and baathists struggled to each other. With the introduction of the Soviet Union, these discussions were camouflaged with the ideology of socialism. Apart from all these incident, in 1958 during the unification of Egypt and Syria there is new formation came to light between Syrian army officers and Cemal Abdünnasır.

Keywords: Syrian army, France, Syrian army officers.

Özet

Fransa, Suriye'nin askeri kurumlarında art niyetli olumsuz bir politika izleyerek grupsal karşıtlıkları temel alan; etnik, dini ve ırki azınlıklara göre yetkilerin dağıtıldığı bir Suriye Ordusu oluşturdu ve geride bıraktı. Fransa bunu yaparken bölge halkının milli egemenlik ve bağımsızlık bilincinden yoksun olduğunu biliyordu. Etnik bilinçli ordu komutanlarının bir kısmı toplumun merkezi otorite alanlarını işgal etmeyi ve buna bağlı zenginlikleri ellerinde tutmayı temel amaç edinmişti. Fransa böyle bir ordu kurmakla, kendi okullarında yetişen bu subayların sürekli olarak ulusal konumlarını güçlendireceklerini ve kendilerini ulusal sadakat noktasında merkeze alacaklarını hesaplamıştı. Bundan dolayı başından itibaren Suriye ordusu Suriye'de her zaman hayati bir role sahip olmuştur. Suriye ordusunun şekillenmesinde etkili olan önemli faktörlerden birisi de Filistin sorunu olmuştur. 1948'de Arap topraklarının işgal edilmesi ve Arapların İsrail karşısında yenilgiye uğraması Suriye ordusu subaylarının kendilerini sorumlu görmelerine neden olmuştur. Bu durum subaylar arasında ciddi çekişmelere neden oldu. Subayların siyasete girmelerine ve karışmalarına yol açtı. 1949 Mart darbesinin Lideri Hüsnü ile birlikte Ordu, Suriye'de siyasetin merkezine yerleşti. Siyasi işlerin birçoğu askeri komitelerin kontrolüne verildi. Edip Çiçekli iktidarı döneminde Dörtlü Albaylar komitesinin ülke yönetimindeki ağırlığı bu durumun örneklerinden bir tanesidir. Daha sonra Adnan Maliki döneminde yine benzer şekilde bir askeri konsey kuruldu. Bu konsey ülkedeki siyasi yetkilerin tümünü kontrolü altına aldı. Suriye ordusu, ülke yönetiminde bu kadar önemli bir rol oynamakla birlikte, kendi içerisinde yetki bölüşümünün etnik, dini ve ırki temellere göre paylaşılmasından dolayı hiçbir zaman mütecanis bir güç ve kuvvet olamadı, hep iç mücadeleler yaşadı. O yıllarda Edip Çiçekli'ye bağlı ordu birlikleri, Şam subayları adıyla bilinen askeri gruplar ve Baas mensubu subaylar birbirleriyle mücadele etti. Sovyetler Birliğinin devreye girmesi ile birlikte bu tartışmalar sosyalizm ideolojisiyle kamufle edilmeye çalışıldı. Ama içten içe rekabet ordu komutanlarının birbirleriyle çatışmalarına neden olmaya devam ediyordu. Bütün bu yaşananlardan ayrı olarak, 1958'de Mısır ile Suriye'nin birleşmesi sürecinde Suriye ordusu subayları ile Cemal Abdünnasır arasında yeni oluşumların ortaya çıkmasına neden oldu. Böylece Suriye Ordusu ulusal çıkarlar ve milli egemenliği değilde farklı grupların çıkarlarını ve kendi iktidarlarını önceleyen bir subaylar koalisyonu olarak kalmaya devam etti.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Suriye ordusu, Fransa, Suriye ordusu subayları

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INTRODUCTION

Despite the evacuation of French troops on the impact of the independence of Syria in 1946, but France has left a negative impact on the Syrian institutions in general and the military in particular, as it relied on the ethnic minorities of ethnic and religious minorities to create sectarian prejudices within the military loyal to it, however it was Batch which she graduated in 1946 from the Military College has played a role in Syria's policy future because it included elements of national played an outstanding role in the Syrian political life over the past 54-1958.²

That the French preferred to recruit various religious and ethnic minorities such as the Druze and Ismailis and Christians, Kurds and Circassians in special forces units, which later became the nucleus of the armed forces of the Syrian and Lebanese, they adopt a policy of recruiting the sons of the tribes remote from the capital and minority groups and focus on minorities with limited aspirations toward independence, Especially in areas that are characterized as less economically developed, but on the other recruited members of large families and the influential Armed Forces Special Near East, in order to ensure the loyalty of minorities and social blocs that they represent, and that the concentration of the French to recruit the sons of poor rural areas, due to that these found in the military a chance to climb the social ladder and enjoy life more welfare.³ In general, no matter what the intentions of the French and their goals, but all of them invoke the national position and national loyalty, as the Syrian army and through his officers and commanders led a positive role in Syrian life.

The increasing number of enrolled college military after the independence of Syria in 1946, as the expansion of the schools allowed a greater opportunity for education, and that the military college require a high school diploma, and thus opened up new opportunities for the poor and middle classes and the rural areas of the military to attend college, And that most of those who took control of the Syrian political life after 1949, they are the minority, and perhaps the most prominent based on coups in Syria in 1949 both Hosni Zaeem and Sami Henawi, they will have their Kurdish backgrounds, has played the Kurds and Circassia's important role under the leadership of Hosni Zaeem, Thus, the people of minority ethnic backgrounds and have played an important role in the coups.⁴ Hence the importance of the perception of the Syrian society in ethnic groups and trends in describing the identity of the Syrian national.

Moreover, it has left the Palestinian issue clear implications on the Arab world in general and Syria in particular, as it carried the successive governments of the Syrian army and the results of the Syrian armed forces defeat against the Zionist enemy in Palestine, Went and took the charges of officers, which has had an impact in pushing Syria into a new phase of conflict and the Syrian army entered the political arena.

These conflicts led to the country's leadership to a series of military coups, as it combined these factors with factors internal and external causes was the main factor which is competition and conflict Internationals on Syria, and this picture of turbulence and frequent coups, which was the result of conflicts and international disputes and international competition have been treated in the previous section of the book.

Since the coup of Hosni Zaeem in March 1949 became the Syrian army leads an active role and contribute actively in the political life of Syria, as thinking that the

² Mustfa Hamdon, a personal interview at the date January 12, 1988.

³ Nicholas Van Dam, the struggle for power in Syria, sectarian, regional and tribal politics, electronic edition 2006, 51.

⁴ Nicholas Van Dam, *ibid*, 52-54.

implementation of a military coup imposes bloc and continuous meetings and consultation in the era of Sami Henawi that adopted the version of Military Council, While back in the era of the Council of four Colonels Shishakli as it was led by al-Shishakli and includes in addition to him (Bunyan, Amin Abu Assaf, Mohammed Nasser) and which Shishakli leads the country by it.⁵ Called The coup in February 1954.

Important shift in the life of Syria and in the lives of the military as it is in spite of the key role that the military tool in ending the rule of Shishakli have walked to his barracks and leave it to the politicians, but he shares a national contribution in the formation of an effective national movement dismissive of Western schemes.

Then emerged the name of Colonel Adnan al-Maliki, a shiny officer in the Syrian army conglomerate around him a number of officers who have contributed to the overthrow Shishakli officers met under the banner of a new Military Commission, As she was convinced those in charge of the military commission it includes officers and national good, so you must give them the opportunity, and the military were not the same formula or an official with one formula and specific, but officers were gathered around Colonel al-Maliki and discuss the political situation, And their main goal is to preserve the independence of Syria and to avoid joining the Western alliance's put on Syria,⁶ Thus, the Military Commission led by Adnan al-Maliki was instrumental in 1954-1955 in response to the Baghdad Pact, Western circles as I realized the seriousness of the role played by Colonel al-Maliki within the military, So was assassinated in 1955, and after his assassination appeared other centers of power in the army appeared Shawkat Shqair Chief of Staff and then Afif Alborzi through military trials and then emerged Alnfora, then appeared Leadership Council in 1957.

Has achieved military leaders the best performance in autism and harmony among themselves in order to protect Syria from a foreign conspiracy are exposed, and they were in the case of a meeting lasting for monitoring the situation and political developments, at the same time, they refuse to control their military unit, and which has characterized the Syrian army during this period Date of Syria is standing row popular trend growing and escalating demands to achieve unity with Egypt , And they had a key role in creating the atmosphere in the nation to achieve the first step in this direction.

Clusters and centers of power within the military

Phenomenon emerged clusters and centers of power in the Syrian army calculated on this side or the other, and often meet army officers and leaders around the officer or senior military commander, has divided the blocks and the centers of power in the Syrian army into several groups and blocks including:

Block Adib Shishakli (translators) and the most prominent officers of the bloc Ameen Alnfora, Hussein Wihda, Ahmed Hanida, Toma Auda Allah and Ahmed Abdel Karim, believed Jassim Alwan (one of the senior officers at this stage, who led a coup in 1961 against the union with Jamal Abdel Nasser) , Abdul Hamid Sarraj can be added to it, while Patrick Seale and supported by Mustafa Hamadoun believe that the officers of this block does not tend to Sarraj even though he came from the middle himself, and formed the bloc after the overthrow Shishakli and leaving the country, as it gave them the opportunity The new government has dealt with them a kind of indulgence, Therefore, their position was weak even though they're the biggest blocs and power centers, and he describes Jassim Alwan they without morale, but they know how to

⁵ Jassim Alwan, a personal interview at the date May 29, 1988.

⁶ Ibid.

leverage opportunities or know where you eaten shoulder,⁷ and they tend to support Khalid Azem. The other mass is the mass of the other officers Shawwam (Damascene), they are the sons of families and bourgeois classes in Damascus and those who sympathize with the People's Party and in favor of union with Iraq, and the most prominent officers Hassan Abid, Mohammad Qabbani, Abdul Rahman Mardam, Ashi Sohail, Akram Derry, Mowaffaq Asash, Luay Al-Shatti, Tawfiq Shatila, and they did not block, but they are a grouping has been weakened as a result of lay off a number of their officers during the conspiracy in 1956.⁸

A block comprising officers Baathists and most prominent Mustafa Hamadoun, Amin al-Hafez, Abdul Ghani piety, Bashir Sadiq, the beauty of the mystic, more Huneidi, Adnan Hamadoun, Salah Jadid, Canaan, New, Munir Moussa, good Wihda, and sympathize with them all of Mustafa Ram Hamdani and Louay Atassi.⁹ Works these officers actively in order to join the new officers to the ranks of their party as they work under the guidance of their leadership of party and are keen to protect the security and organization of the Baath Party within the army, taking into consideration without interference in political affairs, and increased the weight of these officers within the military after that constitute the Leadership Council in 1957 was a Baathist officers who briefed the leadership of the party at all what is happening inside the leadership.¹⁰

It describes Fawzi Shoaib block officers Baathists officers that they are patriots refuse to link Syria to any Western alliances, especially Baghdad Pact, and perhaps provided the coup leader Mustafa Hamadoun last in Syria in 1954, and Lt. Col. Abdul Ghani Qanout are the most prominent officers of this block and driving tank battalions.¹¹

It was Akram Hourani role in the planning of the coup leader, Hosni, as it has ties and friendships with a number of officers, and was with the leader in all his movements, and he prepared the data for the radio and read the statement himself first.¹² As well as he played a key role in the historical period stretching from 1954 until 1958, and in particular to draw the movement of the army and its role in the unity of Syria and Egypt in 1958.

The army and communist influence

In the elections held on May 4, 1957, has been elected three Syrians in the House of Representatives have contacts with the Baath Party, according to the U.S. view, these results reflect further consolidate control of the leftist government, and the persistence of sovereignty left in the army and the continuing elements of the pro-Western and moderate loss of land increasingly entrenched in front of communism, And in front of the policy of the Soviet Union, which is working to strengthen its position through arms deal to Syria, It is through the support of Syria at the United Nations and to stand with them against the activities of Zionism and Israel, and the colonial policy in an effective and influential. These formed penetrating leftist propaganda, the Soviet Union and was awarded possession of the means of subversion and promotion of Communist activity in the region, and suggested that the U.S. ambassador in Damascus that his government put pressure on the Syrian government by diverting the attention of the Arab world, from Egypt to Syria, As has become a tool of the Soviet Union and communism, and it became the base of operations for them in the Near

⁷ Mentions Jassim Alwan he joined this gathering all of Abdul-Hamid Sarraj and Alnfora Allah and to feed Auda and Ahmed Abdul Karim and others.

⁸ Jassim Alwan, a personal interview at the date May 29, 1988.

⁹ Patrick Seale , Ibid,32:alnahar file ,Ibid.12.

¹⁰ Mustfa Hamdon, a personal interview at the date January 12, 1988.

¹¹ Fawzi Shoaib, witness of Syrian intelligence, 1955-1968, 28.

¹² Ghassan Mohammed Rashad N. Haddad from the date of contemporary Syria 1946-1966, Awraq Chamieh, Oman 2001, 36.

East.¹³ In fact, the impact of the Syrian Communist Party within the army is limited not commensurate with the propaganda promoted by means Western media has emerged of officers affiliated with the Communist Party, but in fact they are not organized to him and them chaste Alborzi and Ibrahim Farhood. Propaganda U.S. promotes and exaggerates the effect and influence of the Soviet Union in Syria circulated in the military establishment in particular.

Within the military establishment of the Syrian independent group of officers took part in the political life and have distinguished themselves as military officers skilled Among the most prominent officers of this group Gado Izz al-Din, Jassim Alwan, Mohammed Istanbuli, Mohammed Nesr and Yasin Ferjani. The Abdel-Hamid Sarraj, commander of the Second Division in the Syrian army's most prominent officers independent block, and was connected to all the blocks, and each block of think he is one of them, he is a good link to everyone, and enjoy intelligently and activity has a point of view is able to convince the others out, As well as submitted Ahmed Hanida submitted Tohme Auda God and driving two tank battalions, as well as submitted Akram Derry.¹⁴ It seems that the centers of polarization within the military leadership centered around influential personalities, as well as being subject to the factors of conflict and competition and the effects of the region and political positions.

Arms deal

At this important stage of the history of Syria during 54-1958 held the Syrian government deals with both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to supply the Syrian army with modern weapons at nominal prices and attractive facilities up to each pay 50% of the value of the deal and pay the value of the remaining installments.¹⁵

According to reports by U.S. diplomats, the Syrian government had been in contact with the U.S. government for the purpose of purchasing military equipment consisting of trucks and trailers, and the United States confirms it was considering the Syrian offer, but provided that the purchase price in accordance with the method of payment that has been with Lebanon, Moreover, the United States has been concerned with the need to abort the arms deal Soviet, and encourage Syria and Syrian leaders on the importation of arms from the West, and Nuri Said was referring to the United States that the best thing for Iraq and Syria and the West, to be in Syria friendly government and armed with Western weapons.¹⁶ I believe that the United States did not take the advice of Nuri al-Said and exaggerated the Communist threat in Syria, and did not give them a chance to get the weapon, and as a result did not convince even allies of the military and private Adib Shishakli.

And influenced by the U.S. position of the Soviet arms deal to Syria in the Israeli position of this deal, so when there was talk of arms deals that the Soviet Union intends to provide to Egypt, is also expected to include by Syria, Abba Eban has confirmed that this deal will be a factor in the instability in the region, and calls for the United States to prevent the supply of this transaction, and work to ensure the signing of the Treaty collectively to ensure the survival of the present situation, and prevent any changes that may lead to change the present situation by force, And described by the Israeli official that they do not be like the rabbit waiting to kill, and has been the response of The U.S. Secretary of State, which showed his country's view on arms deals with the Soviet, it was felt that the best way to achieve balance and

¹³ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XIII, , Document 351, Telegram From the Embassy in Syria(Moose) to the Department of State, Damascus, May 17, 1957.

¹⁴ Fawzi Shoaib, witness of Syrian intelligence, 1955-1968, 28.

¹⁵ Jassim Alwan, a personal interview at the date May 29, 1988.

¹⁶ FRUS, 1955-1957, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq 11. Source Washington, October 12, 1955.

compensation for arms deals Soviet is to give military equipment are great for Israel, But taking into consideration that ensure the security of Israel may raise potential problems with the entire Arab world, the United States does not want to be supportive of the Soviet Union in exchange for all Arabs that the United States only supportive of Israel.¹⁷

But the result has stuck to the United States in their choice to support Israel and lost the Arabs. Meaning that they despite being aware of the results of its support for Israel at the expense of the Arabs, they sided with the latter, along with Israel and the Arabs are all lost.

The strong hard Syrian position to refuse alliances and western projects is the one who encouraged the Soviet Union to provide military assistant to them, as well as the van for Syria arms from the Soviet Union to make it in a better position to reject any attempt to pressure exercised by the United States and its allies to force her to bow to the policy and enable the adoption of national position independent.

Therefore, the military establishment in their views and trends in the various subject to influence from the neighboring region such union with Iraq on the one hand and the other direction goal of union with Egypt, as well as conflicts and internal differences that impose themselves in drawing paths and the role of the military in political life in Syria.

Disobedience Qatana

Consists of the Syrian army from the Brigade 72, which includes three infantry battalions portable tank battalion and brigades different chock, and Brigade 18, a infantry brigade portable car-based in Qatana, and Armored Brigade 70, and a brigade of infantry to guard the coast in Latakia, and three infantry brigades and units of chock in front with Israel.¹⁸ The Qatana camp is important and where most of the camps and units of armor and military units task found.

Perhaps disobedience Qatana is the most prominent example of the role and influence of the military in political affairs, as well as an expression of the nature of the conflict and the factors that shape attitudes and different ideas within the institution of the Syrian military.

Was transferred one of the officers Naasan Zakkar to his fellow officers, Baathists that the list of the movements will be issued on 11 March 1957 include new appointments to a number of officers in the military, and between movements transfer Abdel-Hamid Sarraj military attaché in India, so it was believed that these measures are a step to weaken and liquidated.¹⁹ As a result, a meeting in Dar officer Abdul Ghani Qanout as well as his inclusion of all Mustafa Hamadoun and Bashir Sadiq and Nassan Zakkar attributed Henedy in which they agreed to do disobeying military camps in Qatana intended to force the military leadership to cancel the list of transfers, And began implementation of disobedience after office hours on 12 March 1957, as it moved officers Baathists and taken from the headquarters of one of the regimental headquarters for them and they have seized the armor and cut the roads leading to the camps and the control of the Operator, and asked Abdel-Hamid Sarraj not to execute the movement, Because they think that being in leadership in their favor and contacted Ikram Hourani and told him what they agreed on the implementation and supported them, but from the other side does not know whether he may know Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar it or not, and continued to officers implementing

¹⁷ FRUS, 1955–1957, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan 11, Washington, October 2, 1955.

¹⁸ Qatana located in the south-west of Damascus, after 35-40 km and the largest concentrated gatherings of military camps, a Qatana.

¹⁹ alnahar file ,Ibid,13.

disobedience meetings and meetings among themselves, as well as it had been in contact with Akram Hourani and Mahmoud Riad Egyptian ambassador in Damascus.²⁰

Following the arrival of news disobedience to Damascus arrived delegation includes all of Abdul-Hamid Sarraj and Afif Bizri Jamal Alsufi to Qatana to negotiate an end to disobedience and asked the officers to execute those who come to Damascus to discuss the matter with the leadership of the army and the government, It was agreed to send Mustafa Hamadoun to Damascus for this purpose, as he went to Damascus to attend a meeting in the House and Defense Minister Khaled al-Azm, attended as well as the Secretary of Defense all of Sabri al-Asali, Salah Bitar, Khalil Class, Tawfiq Nizamuddin, Afif Alborzi, Ameen Alnfori, Abdul Hamid Sarraj and other officers.

After discussions and verbal altercations and military leadership agreed to the government to meet the conditions of the officers and decided to hold a meeting in the next day to issue a list of new movements, but it seems that Mustafa Hamadoun found it difficult to persuade his colleagues to end the rebellion, Because some of them were thinking about it and continue to implement a military coup, as well as that Mahmoud Riad had contacted officers Baathists implementing disobedience and transfer to them the desire of President Jamal Abdel Nasser in the continued disobedience.²¹

That what happened in Qatana is the first military armed insurrection in Syria, which used to coups, as well as, what happened was not planned thoughtfully, as organizers did not put in their account disobedience actions in which they operate in the state government's rejection of their demands, So as to make them in front of one of two choices: either surrender and exposure to accounting and punishment and either continue to work non-implementation of the calculated results, a military coup, as some of them were believed to have troops in camps Qatana able to threaten Damascus.

And the position of the Baath Party of disobedience, which was carried out by a number of officers in the Syrian army, it seems that Akram Hourani was aware that it is supported, while not all of Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar aware of it because the life of democracy that prevailed in Syria and then go hard towards unity with Egypt make it possible to think the party in the implementation of a military coup.²²

After disobeying Qatana hold a meeting of the leadership of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, Michel Aflaq, Salahuddin Al-Bitar, Akram Al-Hourani, and four officers are Baathists Hamadoun Mustafa, Ameen Hafiz, Abdul Ghani Qunoot, and Bashir alSadiq ,Ameen Hafiz gave the point of view that stretches to Abdel Nasser clean hands in order to achieve unity, he could see where the party is able to change the situation.²³

Generally, the disobedience of Qatna confirms that the Baath party has significant influence within the army, so it may be this description making officers Baathists are thinking in the management of a military coup, but that was impossible because of the clarity of the contexts of work in the life of democracy and multi-party system that existed in Syria at the time.

Following the disobedience of of Qatna in March 1957 and the trial of the conspirators in the Ajlani conspiracy resigned Tawfiq Nizamuddin of the General Staff Event convergence between national officers, to make them agree on the list of transfers and

²⁰ Mustafa Hamdon, a personal interview at the date January 12, 1988.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Shibley Aiseme, a personal interview at the date March 7, 1988.

²³ Amin Hafez, a personal interview at the date 1988.

new appointments to key leadership positions in the army, As tested Afif Alborzi of the General Staff and Mustafa Hamadoun chairman of the Division I and Abdul Hamid Saraj, head of the Division II and Ahmed Abdul Karim President of the Third Division and Ameen Alnfori Associate Chief of Staff and the commander Hafiz Amin of the War College.

In light of the continued and face the conspiracies and pressures and Western schemes was being referred to Syria and at the suggestion of Afif Bizri has been the formation of the leadership of a new military includes chief of staff and leadership of principal and senior officers and officials brigades job in the army and their number 24 officer. The formula of the Council of the new leadership, this time became in an orderly fashion, as the head of the Council is Afif Bizri and the Attorney is Ameen Alnfora and secretary is Jassim Alwan, and hold regular meetings of the Council and systematic records documenting meetings,²⁴ And he was meeting almost daily from seven o'clock pm until late into the night to discuss the political situation and the challenges and risks faced by Syria and took the theme of unity with Egypt, a large portion of Board meetings, as well as that, the relationship between the Council and the government were not has taken a formula formal legitimacy, As the Syrian government was aware of these meetings, As well as the chief of staff and officials of the three divisions were transporting the views of the leadership of the army to the Syrian government.²⁵ In spite of the positive role of the active tool Leadership Council in Syrian political life and confront the plots and schemes that are exposed Syria, this formula expressed illegal interference in the affairs of government and contributed to the creation of a duplication of the mechanism of political decision-making of the military to intervene directly in the political life.

The role of the Syrian army in the unity

To achieve the unity of Syria and Egypt in 1958, goes back to two things, firstly, developments and political positions, which lasted through the years 1955-1958, as it contributed to external factors and internal developments that were working toward pressure on Syria and drag it to the Western policies and to alliances and International Western blocs engaging in projects that serve Israel and its security and interests, The Charter of the Arab defense trio, which was signed by all of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in February and March 1955, is the first step in the task and the basic framework of drawing trends relations and common interests between Syria and Egypt, Despite the withdrawal of Saudi Arabia from this cooperation and joint action, but the Egyptian-Syrian relations have continued and strengthened relations, attitudes and other agreements made track mounts as part of strengthening relations between Syria and Egypt, And promote the charter agreements and economic relations and economic cooperation, joint, generally, the Arab Charter Triple resulted after the withdrawal of Saudi Arabia to sign a joint defense agreement between Syria and Egypt in the October 20, 1955.

As a result, the common positions and as a result of the pressures experienced by both Syria and Egypt, have increased the relations among them became stronger and cohesion, and perhaps Syria's position defender and enthusiastic in supporting Egypt against the tripartite aggression in 1956 contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of national enthusiastic and confirmed existence common interests, achieve the security of both Syria and Egypt with each other, The assistance of the Syrian to Egypt was popular and government the same amount of interest and enthusiasm, not only Syria demonstrations and condemnation, but the ambiance was enthusiastic driven to participate in the support and protection of Egypt, and Egypt responded and responded Egypt Government and people of a similar situation for protection when

²⁴ Jassim Alwan, a personal interview at the date May 29, 1988.

²⁵ Mustafa Hamdon, a personal interview at the date January 12, 1988.

exposed to crowds and Turkish threats, Thus, the path of rapprochement and cooperation and joint action was walking steps according to reinforce a growing trend towards induction and advocacy to achieve unity among them, and strengthened these steps in the joint meetings between the parliaments of the two countries and the emphasis on the unity among them.

The second thing is important in achieving unity with Egypt, it came at the hands of the military establishment of the Syrian, as it is through the exchange of military delegations, parliamentary and talk to Jamal Abdel Nasser was afraid of the military and political action, and the effect of that contract officers of the Syrian army recombinant Leadership Council hold an urgent meeting to discuss the matter, After intense debates the officers decided to formulate a memorandum addressed to the presidents of both the Syrian and Egyptian blame them for the delay in the announcement of the unit. To clarify the role of the Syrian army in achieving unity and resolve the issue we are trying to read this path through the perspective of the officers and politicians involved in the event industry, Indicates Mustafa Hamadoun which the officer who carried out the coup in February 1954 and a member of the Leadership Council, said the proposal to form a delegation to meet with Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser presented by Afif Bizri, who also demanded that the unit is fusion, has been interpreted by Mustafa Hamadoun this position Bizri as a bid the aim from it is to embarrass President Jamal Abdel Nasser and supporters of the union between the two countries, As it is believed that the unit fusion cannot be achieved or accepted,²⁶ while explains Patrick Seale this position that he had come to meet and implement the instructions of the Syrian Communist Party, as the Communist Party wanted from behind this attitude that keeps Alborzi in the center of military powers actors and retains his stature affecting them nor stood against officers strongly motivated towards union with Egypt,²⁷ While he describes Ahmed Mihfil member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Syria at the time, said Bizri was not a communist organizer, but he was sympathetic to the Communists, not to doubt his loyalty and his belief in national unity,²⁸ On the other hand, the team of Syrian President Amin al-Hafez later deny that Al-Bizri, who is demanded of the fusion unity, but he says he objected to it.²⁹

However different views on the interpretation of the motives of the position Afif Bizri, but they agree that he proposed the formation of the owner of the delegation to meet with Abdel Nasser, and this proposal met with acceptance from the Baathists officers and a number of other national officers, It was decided that the military delegation³⁰ travels on the same day, which is 12 January 1958, at the same time was the formation of a military delegation last annexation of all of Amin Alnfora and Ahmed Abdel Karim to deliver a similar message to the Syrian government.³¹

Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli wants to be a federal unit (federal), while Abdel Nasser was seen that the unit must be gradual steps may take five years, but when he noticed the dash and the enthusiasm delegation of the Syrian military, As well as the attitude of some of the Syrian National parties responded to the request and desire of the officers he became convinced that the unity that has according to this desire and this enthusiasm will make them take place under his leadership, according to his will, whatever form this step unit or union.

²⁶ Mustafa Hamadoun interview, personality, May 27, 1988.

²⁷ Patrick Seale, *ibid*, 417.

²⁸ Ahmed Mihfil, a personal interview in February 1988.

²⁹ Amin al-Hafez, a personal interview with the author in February 1988.

³⁰ officers are: Amin al-Hafez, Hamadoun Mustafa, Abdul Ghani Qanout, Abdullah Hassoun, Tohme Audat Allah, Afif Bizri, Abdul Hamid Sarraj, Gado Ezzedine, Jassim Alwan, Bashir Sadiq, Jamal Sufi, Derry Akram, Muhammad Nisser, Ahmed Hanida.

³¹ Ahmed Abdel Karim, the lights on the experience of the unit, library, Atlas, 90.

During a meeting with a delegation of Syrian officers Abdel Nasser, the president gave three conditions for accepting the invitation and the desire to achieve the officers in the unit, the first condition of operation of non-military policy, officers quickly he agreed to this condition, Amin Hafiz spoke on behalf of his colleagues by saying that we are ready to work princes Brigades in the Sinai in return is that this thing means unity,³² The second condition is the disintegration of the political parties, and turned Abdel Nasser to Mustafa Hamadoun and said to him, What do you think hamadon in the dismantling of the Baath Party, replied, Mustafa Hamadoun that this would lead the party, and the officers were convinced that political parties in Syria did not stand without the unit and will accept the solution itself.

This information is mentioned by Syrian officers involved in the industry happened unit in 1958 and who had the opportunity to meet them in 1988 during the preparation of the master's study on the internal political developments in Syria during the years 1954-1958, May be confirmed by a memorandum of conversation from the U.S. State Department, as it suggests that Abdel Nasser put conditions on the delegation Syrian officers not to the functioning of the military in politics or resign from the army in case they wish to work in politics,as well as he had asked them to solve all parties in Syria, the document stressed that the U.S. and Syrian officers have agreed to those conditions.³³

The third condition that Abdel Nasser wanted authorization from the Syrian government that they agree and support the movement and position of the officers on the unit, and immediately traveled to Syria, one of the officers told the Syrian government that, As a result, the Syrian government held a meeting on the fifteenth of January, 1958, and authorized the Syrian government Salah al-Din al-Bitar research with Abdel Nasser mechanisms to achieve unity, and read Al-Fatihah with an expression of agreement on the establishment of unity between Syria and Egypt, In light of this accelerated steps and formed committees, and in the first of February, and after a meeting between the Syrian and Egyptian delegations agreed on the establishment of the unit and presented to a referendum on February 22, 1958, and became a reality.

³² Mustfa Hamdon, a personal interview at the date January 12, 1988.

³³ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Document 200, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 3, 1958. Washington, March 3, 1958.

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